Nonkilling Global Political Science

Glenn D. Paige
Richard C. Snyder
1916 - 1997

H. Hubert Wilson
1909 - 1977

political scientists, teachers, friends
A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost.

Alfred North Whitehead
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Preface

This book is offered for consideration and critical reflection primarily by political science scholars throughout the world from beginning students to professors emeriti. Neither age nor erudition seems to make much difference in the prevailing assumption that killing is an inescapable part of the human condition that must be accepted in political theory and practice. It is hoped that readers will join in questioning this assumption and will contribute further stepping stones of thought and action toward a nonkilling global future.

This may be the first book in the English language to contain the word “nonkilling” in its title. The term is not in customary use. It seeks to direct attention beyond “peace” and even “nonviolence” to focus sharply upon the taking of human life. The initial response of many may be that to focus upon nonkilling is too negative, too narrow, and neglects more important things. They may find company in Gandhi’s admonition that to define *ahimsa* (nonviolence: noninjury in thought, word, and action) as nonkilling offers little improvement over violence.

Yet perhaps even Gandhi as reader, on reflection, might be persuaded that concentration upon liberation from killing as source and sustainer of other forms of violence could be a significant step forward in the political science of nonkilling. And from the politics of taking life to the politics of affirming it.

The thesis of this book is that a nonkilling global society is possible and that changes in the academic discipline of political science and its social role can help to bring it about. The assumption that killing is an inevitable attribute of human nature and social life that must be accepted in the study and practice of politics is questioned as follows. First, it is accepted that humans, biologically and by conditioning, are capable of both killing and nonkilling. Second, it is observed that despite their lethal capability most humans are not and have not been killers. Third, nonkilling capabilities already have been demonstrated in a wide range of social institutions that, if creatively combined and adapted, can serve as component contributions to realize nonkilling societies. Fourth, given present and expectable scientific advances in understanding of the causes of killing, the causes of nonkilling, and causes of transition between killing and nonkilling, both the psychobiological and social factors conducive to lethality are taken to be capable of nonkilling transformative
intervention. Fifth, given the foregoing, the role of lethal human nature as the basis for acceptance of violence in political science and politics must at the very least become problematical as a foundation of the discipline. Sixth, in order to advance toward universally desired elimination of lethality from local and global life, political scientists who are presently not persuaded of human capacity for nonkilling social transformation are invited to join in taking up the possibility as a problem to be investigated hypothetically in terms of pure theory, combining inductive and deductive elements. Hypothetical analysis and role-playing by skeptics as well as by those who accept the possibility of nonkilling transformations can markedly assist disciplinary advance. Just as nuclear deterrence advocates and critics have been able to engage in theoretical and simulated exploration of local and global effects of limited or full-scale nuclear war, nonkilling and violence-accepting political scientists can join in constructively and critically exploring the preconditions, processes, and consequences of commitments to realize nonkilling conditions of global life.

Although this book is addressed primarily to those who study and practice political science, it is obvious that nonkilling societies cannot be realized without the discoveries and contributions of all scholarly disciplines and vocations. A magnificent example is Harvard sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin’s pioneering advance toward an applied science of altruistic love in The Ways and Power of Love (1954). Another is the unprecedented WHO World Report on Violence and Health (2002) which concludes that human violence is a “preventable disease.” We need nonkilling natural and biological sciences, nonkilling social sciences, nonkilling humanities, nonkilling professions, and nonkilling people in every walk of life. Furthermore, in order to understand the full range of past and present human capabilities, we must share knowledge and experience beyond the bounds of local contexts and cultures. To be normatively sensitive, cognitively accurate, and practically relevant, nonkilling political science in conception and participation must be global.

Since first published in 2002, the nonkilling thesis of this book has continued to evoke remarkable responses from readers. An example is Russian political scientist Professor William Smirnov’s judgment: “The basic ideas in this unique book can and should become the basis of common values for humanity in the 21st century as well as a programme for their realization.” Or former Indian prime minister I.K. Gujral’s advice: “This book should be read in every political science department and by the public.”

Reader reflections and more than thirty translations (of which twenty have already been published) foretell that global consideration of its nonkilling thesis will be forthcoming.
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In presenting this book I am especially aware of the influence of two great Princeton politics teachers, Richard C. Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson. To Snyder is owed respect for science, interdisciplinary outreach, the sense that the essence of politics resides in capacity to choose among alternatives, concern for education at all levels, and appreciation that values can serve as spotlights to illumine things that those without such values might not see. To Wilson, as later to Gandhi, is owed the example that a free and just society requires scholars and citizens prepared to speak for truths as they see them, even if it sometimes means to stand alone.

Like all scholars, I have benefited from many sources of inspiration and instruction within and beyond the academic community. Among spiritual leaders, I am especially indebted to Acharyas Tulsi and Mahapragya, Rabbi Philip J. Bentley, Daisaku Ikeda, Lama Doboom Tulk, Fr. George Zabelka, and Abdurrahman Wahid. Among natural, biological and social scientists, to Ahn Chung-Si, Chung Yoon-Jae, James A. Dator, Johan Galtung, Piero Giorgi, Hong Sung-Chick, Lee Jae-Bong, Brian Martin, Ronald M. McCarthy, Bruce E. Morton, Kinhide Mushakoji, Eremey Parnov, Ilya Prigogine, L. Thomas Ramsey, Rhee Yong-Pil, Hiroharu Seki, William Smirnov, Leslie E. Sponsel, Gene Sharp, Ralph Summy, and John Trent. Among humanities scholars, to A.L. Herman, Richard L. Johnson, Chaman Nahal, George Simson, Tatiana Yakshkina, and Michael True. Among librarians, Ruth Binz and Bruce D. Bonta. Among political and social leaders, M. Aram, A.T. Ariyaratne, Danilo Dolci, Gwynfor Evans, Hwang Jang-Yop, Petra K. Kelly, Jean Sadako King, Máiread Corrigan Maguire, Abdul Salam al-Majali, Ronald Mal-


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Introduction

The Policy Sciences of Nonkilling

_Caveat lector_. The book you hold in hand, when read widely and taken seriously, will subvert certain globally prevailing values and the institutions that shape those values. Among such values, goals, preferences, demanded outcomes, events, and acts, as well as corresponding institutions, are those relating to the acquisition and use of power. “Power” designates the processes by which people participate in making decisions for themselves and others that bind them to comply, by coercion if necessary (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: 75). Institutions associated with values of power include more than governments and their decision makers who wage war and apply severe sanctions including death to those who do not conform to public order. Interacting with power institutions are economies of organized entrepreneurs some of whom produce wealth from the inventions, manufactures, sales, and threats to use “arms”; universities among whose faculties some creative members conduct research and devise strategies of force and “coercive diplomacy”; associations of skilled athletes and artists that include those who specialize in violent games and entertainments; hospitals and clinics of venerated medical and health personnel who abort lives and assist in euthanasia; not so secret societies or “private armies” whose participants build and employ lethal weapons in defiance of or with tacit cooperation of public governments; families with members who perform or tolerate abuse among themselves, in some cultures even killing errant spouses, children, or in-laws; and certain religious organizations with faithful adherents who countenance killing deviants from approved doctrines, formulae, and miranda.

As every major sector of society implicates and is implicated by the power processes of its communities, so each supervises, regulates, employs, and corrects, with both positive and negative inducements, sometimes invoking killing, as in the security personnel who perform intimate functions in corporations, on college campuses, among entertainers, at hospitals and clinics, sometimes in family compounds and churches. The interactions between and among power institutions and other social institutions, insofar as they include killings or threats of killings, constitute problems of modern and postmodern societies, as noted by competent observers and expressed by alert participants.
Professor Glenn D. Paige systematically confronts these problems of individual, community, and global proportions, the problems of killing and threats of killing in human affairs. He defines the core of problems by demonstrating the empirical and logical discrepancies between, on the one hand, widely shared human claims, demands, preferences, and rights for minimum public and civic orders of dignity, and on another, the episodic contradictions and denial of those fundamental goals and objectives at virtually every level of social organization—small groups, localities, nations the world—and by varieties of institutions—governmental, economic, educational, skill, medical, social, familial, and religious.

The publication of this book now does not mean that the problems of killing are of recent origin or of sudden recognition. Nor does it mean that the book’s appearance depends solely on the fortuitous application of the author’s imagination and skills as scholar-scientist. Publication now rather than sooner means that despite the longstanding role, often acknowledged, of killing in human organizations and communities, men and women throughout the world have lacked an effective repertoire of problem solving approaches and tools to analyze, anticipate, and adopt alternative courses of policy that might diminish more effectively the probabilities of killing in favor of enhanced possibilities for nonkilling patterns of human interactions affecting all values in every arena.

Such a repertoire embraces the knowledge and skills accumulated among many academic, scientific, and scholarly persons despite or because of the killing around them and their institutions. Philosophers contribute to the formulation of problems, that is, to the postulation and clarification of the goal values and preferences frustrated in practice. Historians, demographers, economists, and others chronicle trends in the pathways of killing and nonkilling, and the rise and fall of human perspectives on all goals and preferences. Anthropologists, biologists, psychologists, and sociologists undertake to discover conditions underlying trends with a view to finding sites and occasions that might be conducive to interrupting gross deviant tendencies and promoting ever more frequent life affirming ones. Still others apply skill to forecasting or projecting paths of trends in the absence of interventions that might resist untoward trends and reinforce preferred ones. And among enlightened and experienced men and women of public affairs, the cadre of competent designers of applicable and feasible alternative courses of policy increase in number and sophistication. These men and women remain primarily in midelite rather than elite positions in which they might innovate in favor of nonkilling. Nevertheless, as specialists in enlight-
enment about human trends, conditions, and prospects, they present a formidable countervailing alternative to experts in violence who have made the last century among the bloodiest eras in the records of humankind while awaiting their rise to power with alternative predispositions and perspectives more favorably disposed toward human dignity. That the bloody twentieth century coincided with the emergence and institutionalization of the policy sciences of nonkilling constitutes a supreme, and welcome, irony.

Glenn Paige acquainted himself with the killing apparatus and capacities of his era by training for and fighting and killing in the Korean War. When he resumed his academic career, he began systematic preparation to be a teacher-scholar with an emphasis on relations among nations, particularly on the making and appraising of foreign policy decisions by key figures of governments (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962). Skilled in several languages as well as broadly educated in the social sciences, he has contributed importantly to a number of subfields of political science (e.g., Paige 1977). Midway in a half century of scholarship his analysis of personal goals brought him face to face with different perspectives on problems, goals, trends, conditions, and prospects of killing and alternative courses of action in education and public affairs to mitigate killing. His fundamental postulate became that prevailing conceptions of the state, notwithstanding occasional contrary voices, and scientific studies of the state are grounded in assumptions that emphasize killing over nonkilling. This book is the fruit of the second half of the author’s long career and an attack on and an alternative to those assumptions, eventuating in the statement on behalf of nonkilling global political science now before the reader.

I have known the author for more than four decades of the period that we appreciate for its vast increases in enlightenment and deplore for its vast increases in the weight, scope, and domain of killing and threats to kill. Not friendship alone, or even respect, considerable as both are, motivate my joining in affirming the worth of this volume for those fellow world citizen-democrats in any arena of any community who identify with promoting non-killing global behaviors. The motivation derives from many scientific and scholarly disciplines in humankind’s shared interests in broad and peaceful as opposed to narrow and violent participation in shaping and sharing all values.

That this book comes from the work of a political scientist says something about its strength and weakness. “Political science” is the last of the social sciences to emphasize science as in modern conceptions of that word. As a “discipline,” if it be worthy of such designation, its weakness is offset by the breadth of its boundaries. From this advantage came a new

I write as one more familiar with institutions of enlightenment and power than any others, having lived, studied, taught, and administered in a variety of American colleges and universities for half a century, while specializing in the observation of power processes in various arenas at local, state, and national community levels in the United States and at varying levels in several other countries. That many of us overlook the presence of killing apparatus and personnel even in the cloister of college campuses is one of the lessons of my former administrative life. When noted, such killing and threats of killing are categorized and rationalized as the costs of doing business, and our colleges and universities indeed resemble business both from adaptations or emulations and also as pacesetters for business, commerce, and finance through our schools of administration, management, organization, and technologies.

The central role of force in political life is more apparent than in other social sectors. Not only is it virtually taken for granted in definitions of the state, but it underlies budgets of national governments for public order, internal security, foreign and defensive policies; appears in reliance of elected officials on sheriffs in political organizations and of force related industries for campaign contributions; and depends on the comfort and safety provided by community policemen near homes, schools, hospitals, and places of worship.

As the academic specialty concentrating on power institutions and their participants, political science might be expected to contribute to broad understanding of the roles and functions of force phenomena. It has, but a glance at the textbooks that introduce students to the subject matter of American politics, comparisons of national governments, and relations among nations would find force more a topic for inter-governmental transactions and violence as occasional cultural eccentricities than as core subjects. This restricted condition of modern political science makes welcome the focused conception proposed by Paige. Herein will be found the exercise of the important intellectual tasks relevant to clarifying goals, surveying trends, and understanding underlying factors which if unchecked will continue rather than alleviate problems of killing.

Here is the beginning of a reversal in the global policies that despite other benign trends contribute to but might counter killing. This is the foundation of
efforts to encourage the further evolution of nonkilling alternatives. Such efforts supplement chance with positive actions that coincide with perspectives rooted in the emerging sciences of cultural evolution, sometimes called “meme tic evolution,” to be distinguished from similar processes of “genetic evolution.” Theories of cultural evolution or co-evolution find increasing prominence in journals and books. Although these theories have yet to be congealed into a generally accepted framework, one of the earliest formulations is also among the most succinct and accessible. We may rely on it to suggest the emerging possibilities for steering further evolution of nonkilling ideas, institutions, and practices (Dawkins, 1976 and 1989).

Nonkilling as a “meme”—theme, symbol, idea, practice—survives or perishes like all other memes, and, so some theorists expect, like genes. To live or die depends on imitation or emulation. And the repetition or replication of a meme is enhanced by the longevity of the concept itself, which gives nonkilling an advantage in memetic development. The advantage resides in human memories and libraries of prayers, beliefs, songs, poems, and other expressions of pacific perspectives and operations. In addition to being preserved in cultural memories, nonkilling practices are reproduced easily, as in the number of nations that have disavowed armies, of communities that have abolished death penalties, of institutions of peace research, of services for dispute mediation and conflict resolution.

To hint at the fecundity of nonkilling practices is to indicate how easily these practices can be copied and have been copied. Moreover, precise copy fidelity is not necessary to keep alive ideas and institutions of nonkilling; indeed, variations from culture to culture, class to class, interest to interest, person to person, situation to situation, offer experiments in the effectiveness of alternative nonkilling policies.

The condition perhaps most related to successful and continuing replication of a memetic innovation is the complex of supportive or unsupportive sources into which it enters. A renewed emphasis in favor of nonkilling hardly could occur at a more fortuitous period, given changing conditions in several value sectors of world society. Consider that the twentieth century marked the arrival and consolidation of the first genuinely democratic states and their diffusion throughout the world in less than a hundred years (Karatnycky 2000). Even allowing for cases of regression or slow downs in the rate of expansion, prospects for continuing not to mention furthering democratization are bright. And evidence accumulates that rulers in democratic regimes are less likely to go to war with each other than those in undemocratic regimes (Oneal and Russett 1999; for qualification, see Gowa 1999). Likewise,
democratic rulers more probably will pursue policies that avoid famines than nondemocratic governors (Sen 1999: 16, 51-3, 155-7, 179-82).

On the heels of the democratic era came post modern concern for broad participation in the shaping and sharing of all values, not just power or wealth. The world wide devotion to respect, self respect and respect for others, supports nonkilling innovations. Similar memes take form even in the killing institutions, as police learn to handle crises of riots and protests more skillfully as well as more peacefully, as professional military personnel adopt globally professional norms reaching beyond the reach of force. And in other sectors of society also, alternatives to abuse and killing appear, as in Favor Houses, curricula in nonviolence, and in broadened conceptions of conscientious objection status.

The promotion of evolutionary biases in favor of nonkilling depends ultimately on more than will and dedication, more than the goodwill of public opinion, but also on secure bases of knowledge from which alternative courses of action may be designed, implemented, and appraised. Hence, the immense importance of a political science of nonkilling.

Therefore, respected reader, you have presented to you a work of science and policy. You are entitled, indeed urged, to suspend judgment until you have encountered the case for a nonkilling global political science. If unconvinced, you can take comfort amid a silent but continuing effective plurality who explicitly or implicitly accepts killing and threats of killing as constitutional. If persuaded, you will find a niche in the complex panoply of opportunities suggested in this book to join in mobilizing the enlightenment and energy of men and women of similar perspectives among every culture, class, interest, and personality type in situations of whatever level of crisis or stress in promoting and favoring strategies of persuasion over those of coercion in every arena affecting all the values of a potentially global commonwealth of human dignity.

James A. Robinson

Pensacola, Christmas Day, 1999
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References


Chapter 1

Is a Nonkilling Society Possible?

Philosophy begins when someone asks a general question, and so does science.

Bertrand Russell

The questions that a country puts are a measure of that country's political development. Often the failure of that country is due to the fact that it has not put the right question to itself.

Jawaharlal Nehru

Is a nonkilling society possible? If not, why not? If yes, why?

But what is meant by a “nonkilling society”? It is a human community, smallest to largest, local to global, characterized by no killing of humans and no threats to kill; no weapons designed to kill humans and no justifications for using them; and no conditions of society dependent upon threat or use of killing force for maintenance or change.

There is neither killing of humans nor threat to kill. This may extend to animals and other forms of life, but nonkilling of humans is a minimum characteristic. There are no threats to kill; the nonkilling condition is not produced by terror.

There are no weapons for killing (outside museums recording the history of human bloodshed) and no legitimizations for taking life. Of course, no weapons are needed to kill—fists or feet suffice—but there is intent neither to employ this capability nor technologically to extend it. Religions do not sanctify lethality; there are no commandments to kill. Governments do not legitimize it; patriotism does not require it; revolutionaries do not prescribe it. Intellectuals do not apologize for it; artists do not celebrate it; folk wisdom does not perpetuate it; common sense does not commend it. In computer terms of this age, society provides neither the “hardware” nor the “software” for killing.

The structure of society does not depend upon lethality. There are no social relationships that require actual or threatened killing to sustain or change